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Introduction
The current study investigates the optimal contract between a risk-neutral principal and an agent who is also risk-neutral but liquidity constrained. Although both parties can observe the agent's contribution to …rm value, lack of veri…cation precludes that the contract can be conditioned on this observation. However, given that the contractual environment re ‡ects a repeated game, the principal can o¤er a self-enforcing implicit contract. In addition, he has invested in a monitoring technology which generates an unbiased performance signal. This signal is veri…able and can therefore be used to condition an explicit bonus scheme.
Any incentive contract which relies on such an explicit bonus is shown to induce a positive rent captured by the agent. This rent can be reduced by increasing the implicit reward for contractual compliance. Consequently, the principal will o¤er the maximum implicit reward which is still credible given that the contract with purely explicit e¤ort incentives constitutes his outside option. The resulting optimal contract then consists of both an implicit reward and an explicit bonus scheme. The former can be interpreted as the agent's salary since it is constant over all periods as long as the agent complies with the implicit contract.
Comparative static analysis of the optimal contract allows to investigate the interplay of these salary and bonus components of the agent's compensation package. As should be expected, the salary is increased and the explicit performance bonus reduced if the probability that the agent leaves the …rm in an upcoming period decreases. However, the optimal e¤ort level ambiguously increases. The enhanced possibility to provide implicit reputational incentives more than compensates the rent savings e¤ect associated with lowering the explicit bonus.
Economically, the contractual environment analyzed below applies to rank and …le managers or average white-collar employees who supply internal services. In contrast, most of the theoretical and empirical work on management incentives has so far focussed on the problem of aligning top management incentives to serve the interests of …rm owners. Notwithstanding that the solution to this problem involves a complex mix of various types of incentive pay -such as stock grants, stock option plans, and bonus thresholds de…ned conditional on the available accounting information -the manager's contribution to …rm value always constitutes a contractible performance measure in these cases. However, according to Prendergast (1999) , most white-collar jobs in …rms lack such possibility of measuring performance by the e¤ect of e¤ort on …rm value. 1 Empirically, Aggarval and Samwick (2003) investigate the performance pay incentives for di¤erent groups of top managers de…ned according to their responsibility for corporate success. It is shown that the relationship between increases in shareholder wealth and the managers'performance pay is strongest for CEOs. Yet, there also exists a positive and signi…cant pay-…rm-performance sensitivity in groups of managers whose performance is not exclusively measured by their contribution to shareholder wealth. Rayton (2003) further reports that the pay-…rm-performance elasticity of the average employee approximately matches the respective elasticities found in previous studies on CEO-incentives.
Such employees' bonus schemes are typically contingent on subjective performance measures.
2 MacLeod (2003) then shows that subjective performance measurement generally implies more compressed compensation relative to the case with veri…able objective performance measures. However, while this study assumes that both contracting parties only possess private measures of performance which may be correlated, the standard approach to incentive setting under subjective performance evaluation uses the repeated game approach to derive the optimal self-enforcing contract. In this scenario the two parties possess identical beliefs concerning the subjective evaluation.
3
The current model is most closely related to Baker et al. (1994) and Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) both of whom analyze the interplay between implicit contractual rules and explicit bonus schemes based on subjective performance evaluations. Given that the performance measure is unbiased, the former …nd that the implicit reward for contractual compliance and the explicit bonus are substitutes. If either the 1 Also, there do not exist objective output measures to de…ne piece-rates or similar incentive schemes associated with traditional blue-collar work.
2 See Baker et al. (1994) and MacLeod and Parent (1999) . Moreover, Ittner et al. (2003) …nd that the subjectivity of the performance evaluation increases over time if the evaluation process allows for su¢ cient discretion of the evaluator. In particular, they investigate the bonus awards in a large …nancial service …rm which uses the Balanced Scorecard system for performance measurement. 3 See Bull (1987) , MacLeod and Malcolmsen (1989) , and, most recently, Levin (2003) who shows that in this case the optimal contract should be of the shirk-threat type.
implicit contract can nearly achieve the …rst-best or if performance measurement is su¢ ciently accurate, only one of these incentive mechanisms will be implemented by the optimal contract.
In contrast, Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) show that, accounting for learning from past observations, the two mechanisms are always complements. If the agent's performance history suggests that the income level in the next upcoming period should be high, the implicit reward increases and the explicit bonus decreases. This adjustment re ‡ects optimal income-smoothing over time while maintaining the e¤ec-tiveness of the e¤ort incentives. Since the implicit contractual reward only depends on whether the employee has supplied the required e¤ort level and is independent of …rm performance, it can be associated with a …xed salary component.
Both Baker et al. (1994) and Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) require risk-aversion on the side of the employee in order to motivate the simultaneous use of implicit and explicit e¤ort incentives. The respective conclusions then further depend on the stochastic properties of the performance signal. Investigating the interplay between implicit and explicit incentives with a risk-neutral but liquidity constrained employee, the current study therefore identi…es yet a third and qualitatively di¤er-ent mechanism a¤ecting the structure of the compensation package. A higher salary re ‡ecting an enhanced possibility to provide implicit incentives serves to minimize the employee's rent derived from the explicit contract.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section introduces the model framework. Section 3 provides the solution to the principal's sub-problem of minimizing the compensation costs associated with particular e¤ort supplies of the agent. In section 4 we derive the optimal contract given that, in every future period, the principal can only o¤er a contract with purely explicit incentives if she breaches the implicit contract. The …nal section contains a summarizing discussion.
The model
We analyze a contracting problem between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent who is liquidity-constrained in a stochastically repeated environment. Specifically, after each period the game is repeated next period with probability p. The agent leaves the …rm and the game ends with probability (1 p). For parsimony, we assume that there is no discounting.
In any given period if production takes place the agent supplies a productive e¤ort e 2 [0; 1] which generates value v(e) with v e (e) > 0 and v ee (e) 5 0. The agent's e¤ort can be thought of as an internal service such that e and v(e) are nonveri…able by a third party. Consequently, they are not explicitly contractible. The agent's private costs of e¤ort are given by c(e) with c(0) = c e (0) = 0, c e (e) > 0, c ee (e) > 0, and c eee (e) = 0 for e > 0, and lim e!1 c(e) = +1. The principal is assumed to observe the agent's e¤ort e.
5 Moreover, there is a monitoring technology generating a veri…able binary signal s with s 2 f0; 1g. For parsimony, we assume Pr[s = 1 j e] = e -hence, we measure e¤ort in terms of the probability to observe the favorable signal.
Due to the repeated game structure, reputational equilibrium may allow the principal to make a credible promise even though it cannot be enforced by a third party. Therefore, the contract o¤ered to the agent may specify an implicit reward schemeŵ
where w = 0 denotes the agent's salary and e a threshold e¤ort. In addition, the principal may o¤er an explicit bonus schemê
contingent on the veri…able signal s and enforceable by a court.
The reputational equilibrium will be sustained by a tit-for-tat strategy where, if the principal once breaks trust, the agent never believes him in all future periods to pay an implicit reward. In such a case, the fall-back contract would solely depend on the explicit bonus scheme.
6 Thus, after a deviation the principal's maximum 4 The main advantage of requiring a positive third derivative is to ensure that the principal's cost function of implementing e¤ort e is convex everywhere. 5 Equivalently she can infer e from v(e). 6 More generally, one would need to consider the possibility of a …xed payment F . If this payment is not bounded, it is well known from the literature that the …rst-best is attainable. However, since pro…t is
be c(e) = 0
where the …rst constraint is a standard incentive compatibility condition and the second requirement follows from voluntary participation. The agent's …rst-order condition is su¢ cient and de…nes the e¤ort implementable by the bonus b. Due to the shape of the agent's cost function, it is easily veri…ed that the participation constraint is always satis…ed, i.e. the agent receives a rent de…ned by R(e) c e (e)e c(e).
An illustrative way of restating the principal's maximization problem (I) is
where c(e) + R(e) are the principal's costs of implementing e¤ort e. Given the foregoing assumptions, an interior solution always exists and it is unique. The optimal e¤ort supply in the deviation contract, hereafter denoted by e D , is characterized by the …rst-order condition
Next, consider the case of designing a credible contract containing both implicit and explicit performance pay. Ex-post the principal will be tempted to deviate, thereby saving w. However, deviations are costly since afterwards per-period pro…ts are constrained by D . Thus, the principal faces a trade-o¤ resulting in a maximally credible implicit reward denoted by w. Initially, taking w as given, we de…ne we are assuming that the agent is liquidity constrained, F , F + b = 0. It is easily veri…ed that, under the assumptions of the model, the optimal …xed payment F is equal to zero. See Demougin and Fluet (2001) .
C P (e; w) as the principal's expected costs associated with inducing e¤ort e. We have C P (e; w) = min (w;b;e)ŵ (e; e) + be (II) s.t.ŵ(e; e) + be c(e) = 0 (7) e = arg max e e=0ŵ
(e e; e) + be e c(e e) (8)
where inequality (7) constitutes the participation constraint and (8) is the incentive compatibility constraint. The left-handed inequality in (9) re ‡ects the agent's liquidity constraint while the right-handed inequality ensures that the implicit reward o¤er is credible.
The compensation cost minimum
Initially, take the bonus b as given and denote by e b the e¤ort level that would satisfy
i.e. the e¤ort sustainable by the bonus alone.
First consider the case where e 5 e b . Obviously, whatever the salary w, the agent will implement e b . Consequently, the principal should set w = 0. Second consider the case where e > e b . The agent will either choose e = e b or e = e. Suppose the agent selects e e < e. Since he never receives the salary w, his optimal decision is characterized by (10) yielding e = e b . Again in this case the principal should set w = 0. Alternatively, suppose the agent were to select e e > e. He receives the salary with certainty and the bonus with probability e e. This however cannot be optimal, since a marginal reduction in e¤ort increases be e c(e e) but leaves the salary una¤ected. Thus the only other possible solution is e = e.
From the foregoing, the principal's cost-minimization problem can be restated as C P (e; w) = min 
Inequality (11) is the agent's participation constraint and (12) constitutes the incentive compatibility constraint. The latter states that the agent is better o¤ supplying e¤ort e rather than e b . Since R(e b ) = 0, (12) guarantees that the participation constraint (11) is always satis…ed and can thus be ignored in the remaining analysis.
Insert …gure 1 about here!
The transformation of problem (II) into problem (III) is illustrated graphically in …gure 1. Suppose the principal o¤ers a contract (w; b; e). If the agent were to select e = e b , determined by c e (e b ) = b, he would not receive the implicit part of the wage. Geometrically, he would attain the rent represented by the distance AB.
If the agent were to choose e¤ort e, he would receive the implicit part of the wage and the explicit bonus with probability e. Geometrically, the rent is then measured by the distance CD. Obviously, the agent will only choose e¤ort e if CD = AB. The …gure also veri…es the foregoing argument that the agent will never supply more e¤ort than e.
Cost-minimization on the part of the principal implies that he should set w to satisfy CD = AB. Analytically, it means that the incentive compatibility constraint (12) is binding. Figure 1 demonstrates the advantage of such a salary-augmented contract over a pure bonus contract. The former reduces the agent's rent from R(e) = ec e (e) c(e) to R(e b ) = e b c e (e b ) c(e b ). As a result, the principal should attempt to keep e b as small as possible, i.e. to o¤er the smallest feasible bonus. There are two possible cases. If w = c(e) is credible, the principal can reduce e b all the way to zero without violating (12). This is the obvious case where a pure reputational contract that extracts the entire rent is feasible.
However, if w < c(e), this solution is not feasible. The principal will therefore choose w = w and e b > 0 to satisfy the incentive compatibility condition 
since e > e b (e; w) in the compensation cost minimum.
We summarize the above conclusions in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The minimum compensation cost of the principal associated with implementing the e¤ort level e is
For w < c(e), the lemma implies 
Further, C P e (e; w) = c e (e) and C P w (e; w) = 0 if, and only if, w = c(e) and, hence, e b (e; w) = 0. Finally, in the appendix we verify that C P ee (e; w) > 0 and C P ew (e; w) 5 0 with strict inequality for e b (e; w) > 0.
Implementing the optimal e¤ort
Now, recall that the maximally credible salary is endogenously determined in an in…nitely repeated reputation game without discounting. If the principal breaches the contract at the end of a period, his one-time bene…t is equal to the savings on salary w. However, in every future period he can only o¤er a contract with purely explicit performance pay to the agent.
From above,
D denotes the optimal per-period expected pro…t after deviation.
Using (16), a contract implementing e¤ort e with both explicit and implicit performance pay is self-enforcing if
where
. Altogether, the principal's problem of maximizing his stream of expected pro…t in the in…nitely repeated reputation game can be formulated as
where denotes the Lagrange-multiplier.
The expected pro…t maximum is characterized by the following …rst-order conditions:
e : v e (e ) C P e (e ; w ) (1 + ) = 0 ,
w : C P w (e ; w ) (1 + ) = 0 .
The superscript " "indicates optimal values.
Proposition 1 Constraint (19) is binding in the optimization problem (20) if
denotes the …rst-best pro…t with e F B characterized by v e (e F B ) = c e (e F B ). Given (23), the optimal explicit bonus is strictly positive.
Proof. Suppose that contrary to the assertion in the proposition (23) is satis…ed, but that the constraint is not binding implying = 0. From (22), we conclude that C P w (w ; e ) = 0 which requires w > c(e). This in turn implies v e (e ) = c e (e ) -hence, the pure reputational contract implements the …rst-best e¤ort level. Clearly, the principal then optimally sets w = c(e F B ). By insertion into (19) we obtain a contradiction, thus verifying that the constraint is indeed binding.
Accordingly,
Condition (23) de…nes a critical C and a corresponding critical probability p C that the agent remains attached to the …rm at the end of each period. For all p < p C the optimal contract always combines salary and bonus. In the remaining, we assume this to be the case. The resulting second-best solution is characterized by v e (e ) C P e (e ; w ) = 0
and v(e ) C P (e ; w )
It follows that
ee (e ; w ) C P ew (e ; w ) 0 C P w (e ; w ) 1 
ee (e ; w ) .
The second equality follows by insertion from the …rst-order condition (22). Consequently,
and
Finally, we are interested in the response of the optimal explicit bonus. In this respect b = c e (e b (w ; e )) implies
Proposition 2 Suppose that the probability that the agent remains within the …rm in an upcoming period permanently increases. Then:
(a) the optimal e¤ort supply e increases;
(b) the optimal salary w increases;
(c) the optimal explicit bonus b decreases.
Proof. Due to > 0 and, as shown in the appendix, C P ee (e ; w ) > 0 , we have > 0.
(a) The appendix also shows that C P ew (e ; w ) < 0. Hence, the expression (28) 
c e (e b (w ; e )) c e (e ) C P ew (e ; w ) + v ee (e ) C P ee (e ; w ) < 0 .
The sign follows because c e (e b (w ; e )) c e (e ) C P ew (e ; w ) C P ee (e ; w ) < 0 as can be easily veri…ed.
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The impact of a variation in p is rather straightforward. A higher p increases the credible maximum implicit reward associated with contract compliance. From (15), this allows a reduction in e b (w ; e ) and the corresponding rent. Thus, the results (b) -(c) of the proposition re ‡ect the principal's enhanced possibility to minimize his total compensation costs associated with inducing e¤ort e. This in turn decreases the principal's marginal cost of implementing e¤ort inducing her to choose a higher optimal e¤ort level. Obviously, given (14), the increase in e¤ort causes second-order e¤ects. The proposition simply veri…es that the primary e¤ects dominate. 7 In particular, note that e b e (w; e) = c e (e b (w; e)) c e (e) e b w (w; e).
Conclusions and discussion
The current study integrates the repeated game approach to implicit contracts and the analysis of explicit bonus rules based on performance evaluation to determine the optimal structure of the compensation scheme for the average white-collar employee. Previous studies by Baker et al. (1994) and Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) have emphasized optimal risk-shifting vis-a-vis the uncertainty of a possibly distorted performance signal or optimal income-smoothing over time, respectively. In contrast, the mechanism discussed above is associated with the principal's possibility to minimize a liquidity-constrained agent's rent.
Given a su¢ ciently low probability that the agent remains attached to his …rm after each period, the optimal contract always entails both an implicit incentive salary and an explicit bonus rule. If this probability increases, the principal can reduce the agent's rent which is derived from the explicit bonus. Hence, the optimal salary and the optimal e¤ort supply increase, while the explicit bonus decreases. Generally, the analysis implies that the share of bonus pay in total income decreases if, due to a more e¤ective reputation mechanism, the optimal e¤ort supply increases. The explicit bonus only substitutes imperfectly for reputational incentives that are insu¢ cient to implement the …rst-best. Consequently, less variable bonus income re ‡ects ceteris paribus more e¤ective e¤ort incentives.
The current analysis can be easily extended to incorporate the possibility of random productivity shocks. Suppose that in every period t revenue is given by t = t v(e t ) where t constitutes a random variable with support (0; 1), Ef t g = 1, and cov( t ; ) = 0 for t 6 = . The constraint (19) can then be restated in terms of expected values. Due to the assumption that the shocks are uncorrelated over time, the corresponding implicit reward w does not depend on the realizations of t . In contrast, the …rst-order condition with respect to the e¤ort supply in period t yields t v e (e t ) = C P e (e t ; w ). Comparative static analysis yields that optimal period t e¤ort is increasing in t . Due to b t = c e (e b (w ; e t )), it also implies that boni are increasing in the productivity shocks.
Given our framework, a statistician gathering data on productivity, e¤ort, and boni would …nd a positive correlation between these variables. However, it would obviously be wrong to conclude that increasing bonus pay improves long-run pro…ts.
This …nding questions some of the common wisdom found in textbooks as well as empirical investigations -in particular, the recent studies of performance pay for rank and …le managers by Aggarval and Samwick (2003) and Rayton (2003) .
The current analysis emphasizes that …rms should generally avoid to imitate incentive schemes observed in contracting environments which do not exactly match their own. For instance, given the di¤erence in unemployment rates between Europe and the US, it also appears plausible that …rm-speci…c turnover rates are lower in Europe. This fact would explain the observed di¤erence in incentive schemes between Europe and the US. Hence, "importing" US-type high-powered incentive schemes to European …rms might well reduce long-run pro…ts.
Finally, our study underlines the danger of misperceiving the implicit reward nature of the salary in …rm-employee disputes. In particular, if labor courts rule that based on customary rights employees are entitled to a salary if such has been regularly paid in the past, the implicit reward structure would be destroyed. Firms would be forced to respond by increasing the share of variable income using explicit boni. Again, this would reduce long-run pro…ts and e¤ort. 
